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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LA RENE HOLMES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
P. C. HEIDEBRECHT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a verdict of a 
jury in favor of defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident involves an automobile-pedestrian 
accident which occurred on the 12th day of September, 
1957, at about 8:00 o'clock A.M. on 12th Street in Ogden, 
Utah. There is little conflict in the evidence. 
Plaintiff resided in the family home situate on the 
North side of 12th Street approximately 525 feet West 
of Washington Boulevard. Twelfth Street extends in 
an easterly and westerly direction. 
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The Holmes' own a considerable portion of land 
bordering on the North side of said street. There are 
no street intersections between Washington Boulevard 
and Wall Avenue and there are no marked pedestrian 
lanes across 12th Street. The only way they could cross 
in a pedestrian lane would require walking easterly to 
Washington Boulevard, a distance of 525 feet, or westerly 
to Wall A venue which is several blocks to the West. 
There is an irrigation ditch extending along the 
South side of 12th Street, South of the sidewalk, which 
furnishes water for the irrigation of the Holmes' prop-
erty as well as other property owners in the vicinity. 
The Holmes maintain a headgate in this ditch in front 
of the Sorensen house located on the South about 40 
feet West of the entrance to their home. Their water 
is transported across 12th Street by an underground 
pipe. Twelfth Street is 42 feet wide from curb to curb 
with a black-top covering about 18 or 19 feet wide ex-
tending down the center leaving a gravel strip of about 
9.5 feet on each side which is readily available for travel. 
There is no painted line dividing the street (see photos, 
defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2). 
On the morning of Septen1ber 12th, at about 7 :45 
o'clock A.l\I., plaintiff proceeded frmn her home drive-
way southerly direct to the headgate to see if the boards 
had been re1noved fron1 the headgate. Upon ascertaining 
that they had been renloYed, she then was standing on 
the South sidewalk at at a point 1narked "X" (defend-
ants Exhibit 2). She looked to the East. saw a car, 
which she recognized as the water 1naster's, proceeding 
easterly son1e distance to the East and sa"· no cars in 
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the immediate vicinity proceeding westerly. She then 
looked to the West and seeing no car approaching in the 
immediate vicinity, she stepped from the sidewalk, across 
the curb and then proceeded in a northeasterly direction 
toward her driveway. The distance from curb along 
this diagonal line is 50 feet. When she had reached a 
point near the center of the highway she was struck by 
defendant's car which was proceeding easterly on 12th 
Street. She was struck by the right headlight of defend-
ant's car. No warning of any kind was given by de-
dendant. Plaintiff sustained very serious injuries. The 
street was clear, the road dry, there was nothing in the 
street to interfere with defendant's vision. He, there-
fore, had a clear and unobstructed view of plaintiff from 
the time she stepped from the sidewalk until she reached 
the point of contact. 
Officer Anderson arrived at the scene of the accident 
shortly after it occurred. He made a careful inspection 
and located the point of contact as being 18 feet 4 inches 
North of the South curb on a direct line which would put 
plaintiff 2 feet 8 inches or one step South of the center 
and measured along the diagonal line she had travelled 
about 22 feet 4 inches after stepping from the sidewalk 
to the South curb so tliat she had walked better than 25 
feet in plain view of defendant as he proceeded along 
said roadway. 
Defendant testified that he had arrived in Ogden 
only two days before the accident and that he was look-
ing for a mail box to post a card to his family. Whatever 
he was doing he certainly was not looking ahead for 
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plaintiff until the moment of impact. 
Plaintiff was thrown upon the hood, carried some 
distance and then thrown violently to the roadway some 
distance to the East of the point of contact. She was 
lying on the blacktop portion of the street with her head 
to the North. Defendant testified he was travelling at 
about 25 miles per hour. 
It is clearly established that inas1nuch as plaintiff 
was struck by the right headlight that defendant's car 
was proceeding easterly over the centerline of the un-
marked street. 
Officer Bennett, a qualified expert, testified that he 
had checked the walking speed of n1any women and that 
the average walking speed is 4.11 feet per second. Plain-
tiff was 54 years of age, a large woman, weighing about 
195 pounds and she testified that she walked at her 
normal gait. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude 
that she was walking at probably a slower speed than 
the average. 
Officer Bennett further testified that if plaintiff 
walked 23 feet at 4.11 feet per second and defendant's 
car was poceeding at the rate of 25 miles per hour he 
would travel 36 2/3 feet per second. Therefore, defend-
ant's car would have been at least 205.29 feet West of 
the point of contact when plaintiff left the curb. He 
further testified that defendant could have stopped his 
car, including reaction ti1ne, in 53.49 feet. In other 
words, defendant could have stopped his car at any 
tin1e before reaching a point 53...!9 feet fr01n the point 
of contact and he could thereby have avoided the accident 
and, of course, he could haYe turned his car to the right 
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and avoided striking the plaintiff when much closer than 
53.49 feet had he been looking ahead for pedestrians. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 8. 
2. The court erred in denying plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant's principal argument relates to the court's 
Instruction No. 8 as follows : 
"The laws of the State of Utah require that 
every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point 
other than within a marked cross-walk or within 
an unmarked cross-walk at an intersection shall 
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the 
roadway. If you find that at the time and place 
of the accident involved in this lawsuit the plain-
tiff, LaRene Holmes, was not crossing the road-
way at a marked or unmarked crosswalk and if 
you further find that she failed to yield the right-
of-way to the defendant's vehicle then you will 
find such conduct on her part to be negligence." 
We contend that this instruction should not have 
been given for the following reasons : 
A. It is an incorrect statement of the law. 
B. It is a so-called formula instruction argumentive 
in nature and fails to set out the principle of law ap-
plicable to the issues impartially as to both plaintiff and 
defendant. 
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Instruction No. 7 tends to mislead or confuse the jury. 
D. It is inconsistent and contradictory to Instruc-
tion No. 7. 
E. It gives undue prominence to the so-called right-
of-way. 
We will discuss these points in the order above set 
forth although there will no doubt be some overlapping 
in our general discussion. 
A. The court fully, correctly and adequately in-
structed the jury on all issues raised by the pleadings, 
absent Instruction No. 8. Instruction No. 7 is taken from 
Utah Jury Instructions Form No. 20.8. It correctly sets 
forth in clear and understandable language the duty im-
posed upon apedestrian who crosses a public high,vay at 
an unmarked point on the highway. Instruction No. 7, 
paragraph 2 says: 
"If she crosses at any other place the law re-
quires her to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles 
on the roadway so near as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard, aithough this requirement does 
not, relieve the driver of a vehicle fron1 the duty 
to exercise ordinary care for the safety of any 
pedestrian upon an~~ roadway." 
Then in Instruction No. 8 the court tells the jury that 
the laws of the State of Utah require every pedestrian 
crossing a roadway at any point other than within a 
nmrked cross-walk to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles 
upon the roadway. There is a vast difference between 
yidding the right-of-way to vehicles on the roadway so 
near a~ to constitute an iln1nediate hazard (Instruction 
No. 7) and a duty to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles 
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upon the roadway (Instruction No. 8). We admit that 
this is the language of the statute yet to merely quote 
the statute without some explanation as to its meaning 
leaves the jury bewildered and confused. 
We invite the court's attention to the case of 
Collins vs. Lindell, 67 Utah 476, 247 Pac. 476. This case 
involves an intersection crossing. The statute which 
applied was as follows : 
"An operator of a vehicle shall have the right-
of-way over the operator of another vehicle who 
is approaching from the left in an intersecting or 
connecting highway and shall give the right-of-
way to an operator of a vehicle approaching him 
from the right at an intersecting or connecting 
highway." 
In this case, like our own, it became the duty of the 
court to interpret to the jury the meaning of this lang-
uage. Plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury 
as to the meaning of this statute which the court refused 
to do. The requested instruction is fully set out on page 
479· of the Pacific Reporter. The court, however, gave 
an instruction (No. 7) and the question was whether or 
not the court committed error in refusing to give the 
requested instruction which defined the statute and 
limited its application to means that the right-of-way ap-
plies only where the travellers or vehicles on intersect-
ing streets approach the crossing so nearly at the same 
time at such rates of speed that if both proceeded each 
without regard for the other a collision is reasonably 
to be apprehended. This court held that the court 
should have given this instruction and that failure to do 
so constititued reversible error notwithstanding the giv-
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ing of Instruction No. 7. 
We quote from Mr. Justice Thurman 
"In the opinion of the writer the statute con-
templates that whenever there is reasonable 
grounds to doubt whether it is safe to attempt to 
cross an intersecting highway in front of a driver 
on the right, the driver on the left should yield 
the right-of-way." 
In other words, the mere quoting of the statutes without 
qualifying and limiting its meaning constitutes prejudic-
ial error. So in our case, the vice of Instruction No. 8 
is clearly demonstrated in this that the court failed to 
tell the jury what is meant by the words 
" ... yield the right-of-way to a vehicle upon 
the roadway." 
What the learned trial judge in effect told the jury 
was that if a person crossed a public highway at an 
unmarked point he must yield the right-of-way to all 
vehicles upon the roadway and that failure to do so 
constituted negligence as a matter of law. 
We cannot conceive of anything more confusing to 
a jury that to tell them that it is the duty of pedestrian 
in crossing at an un1narked crosswalk to yield the right-
of-way to all vehicles upon tlze roadzcay. Notwith-
standing this statute, when correctly interpreted, as 
done in Instruction No., 7. does not require a pedestrian 
to yield the right-of-way to all Yehicles upon the road-
way but what it does require is that the pedestrian must 
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles on the roadway 
approaching so ncar as to constitute an immediate haz-
zard. Literally, the meaning of Instruction No. 8, with-
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out qualification, would mean that no person could ever 
cross a highway at any point other than in a marked 
way and in our case it would be negligence, says the 
crosswalk because there are always cars upon the road-
court, if a car was on 12th Street at any point between 
Wall Avenue and Washington Boulevard and plaintiff 
would be guilty of negligence as a matter of law if she 
attempted to cross the highway. Such is not and cannot 
be the law, irrespective of the language of the statute. 
It might be argued that in view of the fact that 
the court correctly instructed the jury in Instruction No. 
7, that this error is not prejudicial. Our answer is 
found in the case of 
Sorensen v. Bell, 51 Utah 263, 170 Pac. 72 wherein 
the court says in discussing an erroneous instruction 
"True, counsel point to other portions of the 
charge wherein they contend the rule respecting 
the burden of proof is correctly stated. If that 
be conceded, it still does not minimize, much less 
correct the palpable error contained in the fore-
going instruction." 
And Mr. Chief Justice Crockett in the recent case of 
I vie v. Richardson, 336 P. 2d 718 at page 786 says: 
"It is conceded that the issues of contributorv 
negligence was properly covered in the next i:r{-
struction. This, however, pitted one instruction 
against the other and might have been confusing 
to the jury." 
The test for correctness of an instruction is how it will 
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See 88 C. J. S., Page 890 
and a large number of cases cited in the notes and again 
at page 894 that author says: 
"The test for the correctness of an instruction 
does not lie in the indulgence which a lawyer in 
his office with the aid of his books or the trial 
and appellate courts with the benfit of briefs and 
arguments of counsel give to instructions but as 
to how the instruction will naturally be under-
stood by the average men composing juries." 
and at page 897 the author further says: 
"It is proper to refuse and error to give con-
flicting instructions on a material point since a 
charge containing two distinct propositions con-
flicting with each other tends so to confuse the 
jury as to prevent their rendition of an intelligent 
verdict." 
We further contend that the second paragraph of 
Instruction No. 8 is also an incorrect statement of the 
law wherein the court instructs the jury that if they find 
that plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way then you 
will find such conduct on her part to be negligence. This 
is equivalent to a directed verdict. The instruction does 
not tell the jury that they may find the plaintiff guilty 
of negligence but it says that they must find the plain-
tiff guilty of negligence. 
In the case of 
l\1orrison v. Peery, 194 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d T/:2 in 
discussing this question of whether or not the violation 
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"The presumption of negligence on the part 
of defendant arising from auto collision on de-
fendant's wrong side of the road (violation of the 
statute) ceases the moment an explanation is of-
fered, but the evidence upon which the presumpt-
ion is based remains in the case and is to be 
considered by the jury unless there is no confljct 
between such evidence and the explanatory evi-
dence." 
In other words, as we understand it, the mere violation 
of a rule of the road statute does not co.nstitute negli-
gence per se. It merely raises a presumption of negli-
gence. 
Instruction No. 8 is a good example of this pre-
sumption. In Instruction No. 7 the court tells the jury 
that a pedestrian must yield the right-of-way to all 
vehicles on the roadway approaching so near as to con-
stitute an immediate hazard and then is subdivision 3 
of Instruction 7 the court says the amount of caution 
required to constitute ordinary care increases, as does 
the danger that a reasonably prudent person in like 
position would apprehend in this situation. In other 
words, the question should be left to the jury to deter-
mine whether or not, under the facts as disclosed the 
plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent person would 
act in crossing a street when a car was approaching at 
rate of 25 miles per hour ba:ck a distance of better than 
200 feet was guilty of negligence proximately causing or 
contributing to her injuries. 
B. We again refer to Mr. Chief Justice Crockett's 
opinion in the I vie v. Richardson case, supra, wherein 
he refers to Instruction No. 4 and says : 
11 
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"The above instruction taken by itself is in 
error because it fails to take into account the 
possible contributory negligence of the plaintiff. 
This kind of an instruction sometimes referred 
to as a formula instruction which makes a recital 
in accordance with the contention of the party 
and ends with the conclusion and if you so find 
then your verdict must be for the party is not 
generally a good type of instruction to give. This 
is so because it lends itself to the error just noted 
and also because it tends to be argumentive rather 
than to set out the principles of law applicable to 
the issues impartially as to both parties for such 
reasons it is better to avoid giving instructions of 
that type." 
C. We have already discussed how the giving of 
Instruction No. 8 immediately following Instruction No. 
7 would tend to mislead or confuse the jury. 
D. We have also discussed how Instruction No. 8 
is inconsistent and contradictory to Instruction No. 7. 
E.. Instruction No. 7 correctly informed the jury as 
to the respective duties of pedestrians crossing a high-
way on a unmarked crossing and also the duty of the 
driver of the approaching vehicle and the court having 
given this instruction together with Instruction No. g, 
it seems to us that the issues were fully and fairly pre-
sented and that the giving of additional Instruction 
No. 8 gave undue prominence to the alleged contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff. 
88 C. J. S., Page 903 says: 
"It is error to give and ilnproper to refuse 
instructions which unduly e1nphasize issues, 
theories, defenses, particular evidence, specific 
12 
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or assumed facts or burden of proof whether by 
repetition or by singling them out and making 
them unduly prominent." 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. We realize 
that a trial court has considerable discretion in grant-
ing or denying a motion for a new trial and that this 
court will reverse the trial court only upon the showing 
of an abuse of discretion. It is our view, however, that 
this case presents a situation where the refusal of the 
trial court to grant a new trial does constitute an abuse 
of discretion. It must be remembered that there is little 
conflict in the evidence and it is our contention that 
this verdict was contrary both as to law and the 
evidence. This subject is discussed in 
66 C. J. S. starting at Page 200. 
We will quote a few general statements fr01n the above 
text. 
At page 206 the author says: 
"Generally speaking it is grounds for new 
trial that the verdict is contrary to the evidence 
or tothe weight of the evidence providing there 
is substantial evidence adduced to support a 
verdict contrary to the one returned and the trial 
court has the power and the duty to determine 
whether a verdict should be set aside and a new 
trial granted on this ground." 
At Page 211 the author says: 
"A new trial may be permissable or required 
where the verdict is so contrary to the evidence 
or to the weight of the evidence as to indicate 
that the jury were influenced by passion, pre-
13 
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judice or other improper motive even in passing 
on the creditability of instructions notwithstand-
ing there is some evidence in favor of the pre-
vailing party." 
Again at Page 222 the author says: 
"As as general rule a verdict rendered con-
trary to or in disregard of evidence which was 
not improper or inconsistent and was not con-
tradicted or discredited will be set aside and a 
new trial granted . . . Where even opposing in-
terests are deducible from uncontradicted pro-
bative facts the court may draw inferences op-
posed to the inferences accepted by the jury and 
may thus resolve the conflicting inferences in 
favor of the party moving for a new trial." 
This is not a case where a pedestrian suddenly and 
without warning steps from behind a parked automobile 
or in the line of an approaching car in the nighttime such 
as 
Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah 585, 201 P. 2d 495; 
Cox v. Thompson, Utah, 254 P. 2d 1047; 
Smith v. Bennett, Utah , 265 P. 2nd 401. 
This is a case where the defendant in broad daylight 
with an unobstructed clear view ahead strikes a pe-
destrian when she has reached within one step of the 
center of the highway after having travelled in plain 
view a distance of nearly 25 feet. The defendant travel-
ling only 25 miles per hour. 
It see1ns inconceivable to us that under that factual 
situation a jury could have returned a Yerdict in favor 
of the defendant. We can account for it only on the 
theory that the jury either 1nisunderstood the instruct-
14 
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ions or else for s01ne unaccountable reason returned a 
verdict through passion or prejudice. 
Mr. Justice McDonough, in the recent case of 
Winn v. Read, Utah , 335 P. 2d 627, 
in commenting on the facts presented in that case, says: 
"If, as a matter of fact, the horseman, 
though on the wrong side of the road, did travel 
for 30 rods, or any substantial distance on the 
left hand side of the road, then the defendant 
should have observed him and should have 
av?ided running into him. If he failed so to do 
he was guilty of negligence that was the sole 
proximate cause of the collisions." 
So in this case, if the plaintiff was guilty of negli-
gence in failing to see the approaching car at least 200 
feet away fr~m her yet walking as she did in plain 
view for a distance of nearly 25 feet when the driver 
could stop within 53.49 feet and failed to make any effort 
to avoid the accident, it seems to us that the defendant's 
admitted negligence was the sole proximate cause of 
the collision and the defendant certainly had the last 
clear chance to have avoided the accident. 
See Marcellin v. Osguthrope, Utah, 336 P. 2d 779 
wherein Mr. Chief Justice Crockett discusses the doc-
trine of last clear chance. Wherein he states 
"Should we accept the other aspects of plain-
tiff's argument there would still be no basis to 
find that defendant had a clear chance to avoid 
the accident. There must be, as the phrase im-
plies, a fair and clear chance and not a mere 
15 
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possibility that one might have avoided the acci-
dent by the skin of his teeth." 
The undisputed evidence in this case discloses such 
a factual situation did not exist. The evidence con-
clusively shows that the defendant did in fact have a 
fair and clear chance to have avoided the accident. 
We feel strongly that the trial court committed re-
versible error in denying plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LeRoy B. Young, of 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLAS~IANN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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